This paper evaluates the effectiveness of an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product designed to compensate for area average predicted livestock mortality loss in northern Kenya, where previous work has established the presence of poverty traps. We simulate household-specific wealth dynamics based on a model parameterized using rich panel and experimental data from the region. The simulations allow us to investigate patterns of willingness to pay for asset index insurance that is imperfectly correlated with individuals' loss experience. The bifurcated livestock dynamics associated with the poverty trap gives rise to insurance valuation that is highly nonlinear in individual herd size. Willingness to pay among vulnerable groups who most need insurance are, on average, lower than commercially viable rates. And subsidization of IBLI premiums appears to offer more cost-effective poverty reduction than direct transfers to the poor.
Introduction
Index insurance has gained widespread interest in recent years as an instrument for reducing uninsured covariate risk in poor rural areas that typically lack access to commercial insurance products. These financial instruments make indemnity payments based on realizations of an underlying index -based on some objectively measured random variable -relative to a pre-specified threshold, the "strike" (Barnett et al. 2008) .
Index insurance offers significant potential advantages over traditional insurance.
Because indemnity payments are not based on individual claims, insurance companies and insured clients need only monitor the index to know when payments are due. This sharply reduces the transaction costs of monitoring and verifying losses, while also eliminating the asymmetric information problems (i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard) that bedevil conventional insurance. These advantages have sparked considerable interest in index insurance for poor regions otherwise lacking formal insurance access (Barnett and Mahul 2007) .
The advantages of reduced transaction costs and asymmetric information problems, however, come at the cost of increased "basis risk", the imperfect correlation between an insured's loss experience and the behavior of the underlying index on which the index insurance contract is written (Norton et al 2013; Woodard et al. 2008) . A contract holder may experience losses but not receive a payout if the overall index is not triggered. Conversely, the aggregate experience may trigger indemnity payments even to insurees who experience no loss.
Given this tradeoff between basis risk and reduced incentive problems and transactions costs, the impact of index insurance on well-being remains underinvestigated, especially in the case of index insurance on assets that determine the time path of future earnings and welfare. And because the current experience of index insurance has thus far been plagued by limited uptake and predictable questions about the quality of the initial contracts (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012) , empirical evidence on the impact of index insurance on the well-being of otherwise-uninsured poor populations remain quite rare. This paper offers some initial, ex ante impact assessment of a specific index insurance contract that launched in Northern Kenya in 2010. It also offers an innovative approach to establishing the ex ante welfare effects of and willingness to pay for asset insurance and demonstrates how the presence of asset thresholds associated with poverty traps can affect insurance valuation and effectiveness.
The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east Africa are among the poorest regions on Earth, with severe (less than $1/day) poverty rates routinely in excess of 75%. Given meager rainfall and infrastructure, the pastoralist populations who inhabit these areas rely heavily on extensive livestock grazing for their livelihood. Recent economic research, building on extensive prior ethnographic work, finds that east African pastoralists operate in an environment characterized by multiple herd size equilibria characteristic of poverty traps (Lybbert et al. 2004 , Santos and Barrett 2011 . The prominent role that uninsured covariate climate risk plays in driving pastoral poverty traps (Santos and Barrett 2007) and growing concern that droughts are driving growing numbers of pastoralists into destitution (Sandford 2006, Little et al. 2008, Barrett and Santos forthcoming) , naturally motivated the recent development of index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) against catastrophic herd loss in the northern Kenyan ASAL (Chantarat et al. 2013) . These IBLI products have been commercially piloted since January 2010.
Like typical insurance, IBLI compensates for livestock loss. But unlike traditional insurance, it only compensates for covariate herd losses that are predicted by the historical relationship with remotely sensed Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI) measures; an indicator of vegetative cover widely used in drought monitoring programs in Africa. These data are publicly available in near-real time and objectively verifiable. Chantarat et al. (2013) explain the details of the IBLI contract design and show that it performs extremely well out-of-sample in insuring against catastrophic covariate shocks in this region. In this paper we use household-level panel data to simulate the impact of IBLI on Northern Kenyan pastoral households' welfare dynamics. This paper makes several novel contributions to the literature. First, IBLI insures assets rather than income. Although the overwhelming majority of the global insurance market insures assets through property and casualty, life or health insurance products, most index insurance on offer in the developing world focus on replacing lost income, typically due to rainfall shocks that affect crop production. The loss of productive assets like livestock potentially disrupts future income processes, not just current earnings.
Furthermore, in the presence of a poverty trap, shocks that push herd sizes below a critical threshold at which herd dynamics bifurcate can have especially severe consequences. The point of bifurcation is critical because below this threshold the rate at which the livestock asset is depleted due to death loss far exceeds any short run possibility of rebuilding the herd. Thus insurance that effectively protects households from slipping into the poverty trap can be of especially high value to those near the threshold (Lybbert and Barrett 2011) . Conversely, insurance that consumes scarce resources and fails to protect the household from catastrophic shocks can do damage.
Given these considerations, we evaluate IBLI's performance using a dynamic simulation model rather than the usual static approach employed in the existing literature. We show that the effectiveness of IBLI depends on initial herd size relative to the bifurcation threshold as well as, to a lesser degree, on household-specific basis risk and risk preferences.
Second, rather than modeling performance for a representative agent, as is the norm in the extant literature (Skees et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004; Deng 2007) , we explicitly study how IBLI performance varies based on variation in household characteristics, such as initial herd size, and key basis risk and risk preference parameters. And rather than making assumptions about these parameters, we estimate them from panel data and field experiments from the area. Contracts that perform well for a representative household may not prove effective for target subpopulations. We show that may be the case with IBLI.
Finally, household-level simulation analysis allows us to compare the outcomes of various subsidization programs and targeting schemes. Our analysis finds that IBLI subsidies targeted toward vulnerable-but-non-poor pastoralists create an effective safety net by protecting such households from slipping into a poverty trap after a drought. This reinforces prior work suggesting that safety net interventions targeting the non-poor can reduce poverty in the long run by stemming the rate of inflow into the ranks of the chronically poor following a shock (Barrett et al. 2012 ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the study locations and the multiple equilibria poverty trap found in the region. Section 3 introduces IBLI. Section 4 then describes the dynamic model we use in the simulations and introduces the certainty equivalent herd growth rate, which we use as a key performance evaluation criterion. Section 5 estimates distributions of basis risk, risk preferences and other key household characteristics necessary for the simulations.
Section 6 reports the estimated IBLI performance and how this varies based on identifiable household characteristics. Section 7 estimates households' willingness to pay for the optimal contract and aggregate demand for IBLI. Section 8 then explores how alternative approaches to offering IBLI commercially or with safety net subsidies affect wealth and poverty dynamics in the system. Section 9 concludes.
Pastoralism in northern Kenya and multiple-equilibria poverty traps
Extensive livestock grazing represents the key livelihood in the northern Kenyan ASAL.
Pastoralists move their herds in response to spatiotemporal variability in forage and water access. Northern Kenya experiences bimodal rainfall, defined by long rains that fall March-May, followed by a long dry season (June-September), then a short rains season from October-December followed by a January-February short dry season. We henceforth refer to the March-September period as the LRLD season (for long rains and long dry), and the October-February period as SRSD (for short rains and short dry).
When the rains fail, especially over two rainy seasons in a row, catastrophic herd losses commonly ensue.
As seasonal migration is critical to sustain viable herd accumulation but migratory livelihood requires minimum household consumption out of household herd, positive herd growth overtime might not be achievable by everyone in this region. Previous research (Lybbert et al. 2004 , McPeak 2004 , Santos and Barrett 2007 , 2011 has indeed found prominent evidence of multiple-equilibria of long-run herd sizes, whereby herd accumulation bifurcates with respect to a critical herd size threshold typically in the range of 10-20 total livestock units (TLU) 1 . Using longitudinal herd accumulation data from the region, this literature found that, on average, herd sizes above the critical threshold tend to grow over time toward a high-level stable equilibrium of 55-60 TLU, while herd sizes below this critical herd threshold tend to collapse over time toward irreversible destitution -another stable equilibrium. In the absence of financial markets, pastoral households with small herd sizes are credit constrained and thus unable 1 1 TLU = 1 cattle = 10 goats or sheep = 0.7 camels.
to restock toward the critical threshold. They tend to be trapped in a low-level equilibrium poverty trap. The presence of a multiple-equilibria poverty trap in the region also implies that uninsured shocks could have irreversible long-term consequences for herd accumulation and welfare, in particular when shocks make household herds fall below the critical threshold. Insurance that could protect herd size from falling below the threshold could thus be very valuable.
We investigate IBLI performance in Marsabit District, Kenya, for which this product was developed on a pilot basis. We use data from four locations -Dirib Gombo, (PARIMA) project , and a separate survey fielded during May-August 2008 among 42 households in each location (Chantarat et al. 2009 ). The latter survey included field experiments to elicit risk preferences.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] Sample households rely on livestock and livestock products for 18-87% of their income. Severe poverty is widespread and inversely correlated with herd sizes because livestock are the main productive asset owned in the region. As a result, livestock 2 All summary statistics are weighted by appropriate stratified sampling weights. mortality is considered the main threat to pastoralists' livelihood (Little et al. 2008) . These catastrophic losses were typically due to covariate shocks related to forage and water availability, while modest losses of individual animals were more commonly idiosyncratic experiences (e.g., due to predators or injury). Chantarat et al. (2013) 
Index based livestock insurance
For IBLI to be commercially viable, the insurance underwriter adds a premium loading 0  a over the actuarially fair rate -i.e., the rate estimated based on the empirical distribution of NDVI -to take into account administrative costs, model uncertainty and required profit margins.
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The loaded premium rate for coverage season t and location l, quoted as a percentage of total insured herd value, can therefore be calculated as
The left panel of Table 2 summarizes the predicted mortality index ) ( lt ndvi M for each of the four study locations constructed using the full NDVI series available from 1982-2008 and the livestock mortality predictive model developed by Chantarat et al. (2013) . The predicted herd mortality indices average 8-9%. The right panel of Table 2 also shows the actuarially fair IBLI premium rate, which varies across locations due to differences in the distributions of predicted herd mortality index. In what follows, we use 54 seasons of predicted area average herd mortality and the associated fair premium rates to evaluate IBLI performance.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Analytical framework
With this simple background on the region, the data and IBLI behind us, we now develop a simple dynamic model that accommodates the nonlinear, bifurcated herd dynamics that describe multiple-equilibria poverty trap previously observed in the region.
A stylized model of multiple-equilibria poverty trap
Denote the herd size, in TLU, realized by household i in location l at the beginning of 
Setting the subsistence consumption level at 0.5 TLU per season per household, 4 Figure 2 illustrates the nonlinear expected net herd growth estimated nonparametrically 5 4 Previous survey work in this region finds average livestock offtake for household consumption averages slightly less than one goat a month (McPeak 2004) . According to FAO (1992) , five goats (each yielding 20 kilograms of meat equivalent to 5000 grams of protein) gives an average family of three 46 grams of protein per day per individual, nearly the recommended daily intake of 50 grams of protein per day per individual. 5 The function is estimated using Epanechnikov kernel with rule-of-thumb optimal bandwidth. using observed household herd data (birth, mortality, purchase, exchange, sale, slaughter and transfer rates) in 2000-2002 and 2007-2008 . This pattern implies the bifurcated herd threshold at around 15 TLU per household -consistent with previous findings (Lybbert et al. 2004 , McPeak 2004 , Santos and Barrett 2007 , 2011 ) -below which herds collapse over time toward a stable equilibria of 0 TLU, implying an exit from pastoralism. Above that threshold, herds grow toward a high-level stable equilibrium size of 55-60 TLU.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
With a subsistent consumption constraint , household i then derives intertemporal utility based on a simplified constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function defined over livestock wealth as 
, provides a measure of dynamic welfare improvement due to insurance. This measure has general applicability to dynamic welfare analysis with respect to any asset insurance.
The certainty equivalent growth rate thereby provides a convenient measure of the intertemporal welfare impact of IBLI given the underlying herd dynamics, in contrast to the existing literature, which concentrates on static impact analysis.
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This is important because IBLI performance in the initial insured seasons affects performance in later seasons through the reinforcing impact of herd dynamics where growth patterns are nonlinear. For example, if IBLI fails to protect household from losses in the initial seasons that set it on a herd decumulation trajectory, IBLI's long-term performance could be compromised by the initial herd collapse and ensuing dominant herd dynamics.
Because the welfare and growth effects of loss vary depending on where in the herd size distribution one experiences loss, standard insurance performance measures based on induced changes in outcome distributions evaluated at the population means will not suffice in this setting.
Managing mortality risk with IBLI
IBLI compensates for covariate livestock mortality loss based on the predicted herd mortality index in each location, ) (
. For simplicity, we assume that the household insures either all or none of its herd at the start of each season, which enables us to compare fully insured herds under several contract specifications against the case of no insurance. The insured herd size realized at the end of coverage season t for a household in location l can thus be written as
where ilt g represents the non-mortality component in the net growth rate in (3). 7 Another approach concentrates on measuring changes in the distribution of the insured outcome based on mean-variance measures, e.g., coefficient of variation, value at risk and downside risk measures (Skees et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004) . Since that approach ignores the insuree's risk preferences, it may misestimate the benefit of insurance (Fishburn 1977; Breustedt et al. 2008 ).
IBLI thus reduces expected net herd growth in good seasons by the IBLI premium, a lt  , but IBLI should at least partially compensate for losses during periods of substantial covariate herd mortality through the indemnity payment, lt  . Given certain cost and uncertain benefit, the household-specific basis risk with respect to the contract
is thus a key determinant of IBLI performance. According to (1) and (7), basis risk depends on the correlation between the predicted area average mortality index,
, and the individual-specific mortality rate, ) , ( 
Threshold-based IBLI performance
Holding risk preferences and basis risk determinants constant, Appendix 1 shows analytically that the dynamic welfare effect, and consequently the household's valuations of IBLI vary with initial herd size in the presence of bifurcated asset dynamics.
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In particular, we show that four distinct cohorts could emerge.
(I) For the poorest households whose herd sizes are too far beneath the critical herd size threshold, IBLI cannot alter herd dynamics. IBLI only provides typical insurance in reducing the probability of herd loss during a bad season, while the premium payment speeds up herd decumulation during good seasons. These poorest households' 9 We note that we abstract from the very real possibility that IBLI induces a change in households' investment behavior, for the simple reason that without any prior observation of IBLI, or some other form of insurance, we have no firm empirical basis for specifying such behavioral responses. Since IBLI could induce either increased investment in livestock by making them a less risky asset or decreased investment in livestock if households were engaged in precautionary savings in kind to deal with uninsured risk exposure, it is unclear what bias, if any, is introduced by this assumption of no investment response.
IBLI valuation would thus be the same as that in the standard insurance case without bifurcated asset dynamics. However, since households in this cohort converge to the lowlevel equilibrium with or without insurance, IBLI offers them relatively little in the way of economic relief. Other instruments are better suited to meet their needs.
(II) Those households whose herd sizes are just marginally above the herd threshold expect to grow their herds if the season is good and if they do not pay the insurance premium. For these households, paying the insurance premium may actually drop them below the threshold. Consequently, IBLI can have adverse consequences to herd growth dynamics for this subpopulation. The value of IBLI is therefore lower than it would be absent the bifurcated herd dynamics, holding risk preferences and basis risk constant.
(III) Vulnerable households are those whose herd sizes are modestly above, but still vulnerable to the risk of falling below, the critical herd threshold. IBLI can protect vulnerable households from falling below the poverty trap threshold in the wake of adverse insured shocks. IBLI can thus offer especially favorable dynamic impacts by keeping the household on its herd growth trajectory. IBLI therefore increases this subpopulation's insurance valuation relative to the case without bifurcated asset dynamics.
(IV) For the non-poor households with herd sizes so large that even without insurance they are not expected to fall below the critical herd threshold after covariate shocks, IBLI would not alter their herd dynamics, just as was the case with the first cohort (with the smallest herds). But because these larger herd sizes can enjoy higher expected net herd growth, which IBLI compensation could preserve in the event of a payout, their valuation of IBLI is significantly more than those in the first cohort.
Overall, cohorts three and four -the wealthier segments of this at-risk population -could represent the main source of demand for IBLI in this setting. The first two cohorts could also benefit from IBLI, but perhaps only with significant subsidies to the cohort approaching the herd size threshold from below, and with virtually free insurance for the very poor. Such policy options are discussed in detail later in the paper.
Empirical estimation and simulation
We simulate households' herd dynamics and key performance determinants -household risk preferences and basis risk -as a first step towards exploring the effectiveness of IBLI contracts over many sets of seasons, with different initial seasonal outcomes. The main component in estimating and simulating herd dynamics is the net herd growth rate in (3). We estimate the non-mortality component separately from the mortality component as we are particularly interested in estimating the key basis risk determinants directly from the correlations between individual households' livestock mortality and the location-specific predicted herd loss index that triggers IBLI payout.
We first estimate the non-mortality component of the seasonal livestock growth function in (3) beginning TLU herd size conditional on whether the observed season is good or bad, as defined by seasonal NDVI data according to Chantarat et al. (2013) . The two estimated non-mortality growth functions conditional on the vegetation condition are then used in the simulation of herd dynamics. They are plotted in Appendix 2.
Next, we estimate the relationship between household-specific herd mortality rates and the location-average predicted mortality index described in (8). We pool four seasons of household-specific mortality rates across the four 2000-2 study locations. A linear relationship between deviations of the two from their long-term means is then estimated using a random coefficient model with random effects on the slope coefficient, commonly known as "beta".
This model, estimated by maximum likelihood, allows us to take into account variation in slope coefficients across households.
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The estimated slope coefficient represents the degree of sensitivity of household's mortality loss to the predicted covariate mortality index for their location. Of course there may still be other covariatebut-unpredicted components, in addition to the idiosyncratic component, in the model's disturbances, which can potentially result in cross-sectional correlation. In an attempt to disaggregate these two components in the disturbances, the predicted seasonal householdspecific residual ilt ˆ is projected onto its location-specific mean each season, lt  .
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So the model we estimate can be summarized as 12 Estimation of models of beta-representation (e.g., the CAPM model in financial econometrics) generally rely on the seemingly unrelated regressions model for sector-specific equations, which allows for unrestricted error structures (e.g., due to potentially cross-sectional correlations). In our case, we do not have enough longitudinal observations of individual households to apply that model. 13 The intercept for this model is zero by construction. 14 The overall average herd sizes observed from 2000-2002 and 2007-2008 are used as representatives of the beginning herd sizes in the four locations. 15 Though our estimations and simulations from this point on were location-specific, we report overall results. Some location-specific results are reported in the Appendices; the rest can be requested from the lead author. 16 Because the first equation in (16) implies the estimated household beta only with respect to the hedgable mortality index, this does not have to be centered at one, unlike the estimated household beta with respect to area-average losses -such as is commonly used in agricultural finance literature for measuring basis risk with a standard deviation of 0.5. The distribution of the mean-zero unpredicted component of mortality losses also exhibits high variation, ranging from -0.42 to 0.44 with a standard deviation of 0.12. This dispersion indicates considerable basis risk in IBLI in spite of the product's very strong out-of-sample performance (Chantarat et al. 2013) , and the potential for significant, predictable variation in performance across households.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We then estimate parametrically the best-fit joint distributions, by location, of the estimated household-specific characteristics   (Carter et al. 2007; Miranda 1991) . In contrast, the estimated   i is centered at one by construction. 17 We use the location-specific distribution of ilt e since we do not have enough individual data to simulate the individual-specific distributions. growth in the simulated herd dynamics can be shown by simply estimating the autoregression in (4) for 10-season (5-year) lags. Figure 5 plots We consider five IBLI contracts with five strike levels of five percent increments from 10-30%. Households are assumed to insure their entire herd. For each contract, we simulate the resulting insured herd dynamics based on (7) using the distribution of location-specific seasonal predicted mortality index ) ( lt ndvi M and the location-specific premium rate shown in Table 2 .
As we compute the value of insurance based on the expected utility approach, the certainty equivalent herd growth depends on household discount rates and risk preferences. For simplicity, we assume no discounting, 1   . We calibrate householdspecific CRRA parameters based on a simple Binswanger lottery game run among the households in June-July 2008 (Chantarat et al. 2009 ).
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For each location, we then randomly assign each simulated household with one of the six CRRA parameters based on the observed wealth strata specific distributions of CRRA.
6. The effectiveness of IBLI for managing livestock asset risk immediately at or slightly below the critical threshold. This pastoralist was hit by large covariate shocks that so disrupted his asset accumulation that he ended on a decumulating growth path without insurance. But with IBLI imperfectly compensating for the losses, decumulation was averted, and the result was a stabilized growth trajectory.
Because IBLI changes his herd dynamics by insuring against catastrophic collapse, the 19 Households were first given 100 Ksh for participating. Then we introduced five lotteries, which vary by risk and expected return. Respondents were invited to use their 100 Ksh to play one of the five lotteries for a real prize, if they wished. If they decided to pay 100 Ksh to play, they were then asked to choose their most preferred lottery to play. A fair coin was then tossed to determine their prize. Six categories of risk aversion associated with six (geometric mean) coefficients of relative risk aversion were derived based on households' choices. Appendix 5 summarizes the results of this risk preference elicitation experiment. 20 Our model assumes away possible indirect benefits of IBLI, such as its potential to crowd in finance for ancillary investment and growth. If IBLI crowds in credit access, it may alter the growth trajectory and the critical herd size threshold, opening up the possibility that IBLI benefits the least well-off pastoralists as well. Our data do not permit credible parameterization of such shifts, so we abstract from them in this analysis.
certainty equivalent herd growth associated with IBLI should be relatively high due to the added effect of the bifurcated herd dynamics in the system. Panel (c) presents the opposite case, in which a pastoralist with the same initial herd size of 15 TLU could slowly climb onto the herd growth trajectory during good vegetative seasons if he did not pay an IBLI premium. If his luck holds, he could escape the poverty trap without IBLI; the premium payments in this case actually retard progress. The difference between panels (b) and (c) purely reflect the ex-post effects due to random draws of seasonal condition and reflect the great value of insurance when it proves to have been needed, and also the adverse effects of premium payments on those who enjoyed a streak of good luck.
Panel (d) presents the case of a pastoralist with 20 TLU, who would be vulnerable to shocks that could knock him onto the decumulation trajectory in the absence of effective insurance. We see that for vulnerable households just above the critical herd size threshold, well-designed IBLI can effectively move them away from the poverty trap, substantially lessening the probability of herd size collapse. This is the population that benefits most, in expectation, from IBLI.
Panel (e) depicts the common pattern of IBLI performance for pastoralists with large initial herd sizes -e.g., 30 TLU -who face little immediate danger of falling into destitution. IBLI contracts provide typical insurance, reducing the probability of herd losses, while seasonal premium payments also reduce the chance of reaching extremely large herd sizes. This simply reflects the second-order stochastic dominance of the insured herd sizes relative to the uninsured.
The ex ante wealth impacts on IBLI performance shown in Figure 6 , however, holds constant other household-and location-specific characteristics that determine a household's basis risk exposure associated with IBLI.
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We now consider the performance of actuarially fair IBLI contracts conditional on contract specifications and household characteristics. Table 3 reports the change in certainty equivalent herd growth rate (also referred to as the positive risk premium growth rate) associated with IBLI for 15 stylized households (with individual mean mortality fixed at the location-averaged mean predicted mortality index) in each of the four locations.
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Various results emerge.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] First, we observe that IBLI performance varies with beginning herd sizes, confirming the patterns shown in Figure 6 . IBLI gains are negligible for pastoralists with the lowest herd sizes (5 TLU) and highest for those with the herd sizes around the critical herd threshold (e.g., 15-20 TLU). IBLI does not seem well suited for the poorest herders whose low endowments leave them trapped by the underlying dynamics of the system rather than by uninsured risk exposure. By contrast, those with marginally viable herd sizes are especially susceptible to shocks thus insurance is potentially of considerable benefit to them.
Second, IBLI performance tends to improve as beta increases, holding other things equal. This implies that over-insuring tends to have far larger adverse impact on herd dynamics than does underinsuring. Indeed, IBLI typically benefits most those with beta=1.5 rather than those whose herd sizes tend to move one-for-one with local averages. Households with greater-than-average risk exposure (e.g., beta>1) find IBLI especially valuable, despite only-partial coverage from IBLI.
Finally, these simulations suggest that the IBLI contract with a 10% strike level outperforms other contracts, on average, even though the 10% strike contract is more costly than the others. The greater protection apparently is worth it given the risk of falling beneath the critical herd size threshold. This effect is most pronounced for those with initial herd sizes just above the threshold (at 20 TLU), whose vulnerability to shocks is best addressed with a low strike insurance contract.
Having observed how variations in household-specific characteristics could affect individual-level IBLI performance, we now explore how the observed location-specific distributions of those characteristics affect IBLI performance at a more aggregate scale. The 10% strike contract appears to have the highest performance holding other things equal. On average, actuarially fair IBLI contracts with a 10% strike level result in a 17% increase in the long-term mean herd size, and a reduction in downside risk of 12%.
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On average, certainty equivalent herd growth increases only modestly with increasing risk aversion.
In general, effective demand for IBLI (e.g., positive risk premium herd growth rate) exists in all locations for IBLI contracts with less than a 30% strike, with the highest demand for the 10% strike contract. But not everyone benefits. Figure 7 presents the cumulative distributions of the improvement in certainty equivalent growth rates with respect to three different IBLI contracts in these four locations. At least half the households benefit from an IBLI contract with a 10% strike (slightly lower proportions for other strike levels) with the positive risk premium growth rates associated with the contract ranging up to almost 100%. The distribution of valuations for the 10% contract clearly dominates that of the other contracts in these locations.
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]

Willingness to pay and potential demand for IBLI
The preceding analysis offers a glimpse into prospective demand patterns for IBLI. So far, we have explored the performance of IBLI contracts sold at actuarially fair premium rates. But an insurer needs to add a commercial loading. This will change the impact of IBLI on herd dynamics by changing the premium paid for insurance. We can use this same simulation model to estimate demand for IBLI by searching for the a lt  that drives the risk premium growth rate to zero. In this section, we explore demand for the 10% strike IBLI contract previously shown to have the greatest expected benefit for most pastoralists in the region. 23 These two measures are used widely in the mean-variance evaluation approach of agricultural insurance. Downside risk reduction is measured by semi-variance reduction of the insured herd dynamics with IBLI relative to the uninsured herd. Specifically, semi-variance of the insured herd dynamics over a set of consecutive seasons T t,..., , denoted by   We first estimate the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for IBLI of each simulated pastoralist by searching for the maximum premium loading ) (a according to (2) that still yields a non-negative risk premium growth rate. The expected maximum willingness to pay conditional on household initial herd size is then estimated nonparametrically across 2000 simulated pastoralists. The average herd-conditional WTP is shown in Figure 8 , plotted against the observed herd size distribution.
[ Aggregate demand for IBLI seems very price elastic with reduction in quantity demanded by 55% as the fair premium rate is loaded by 20%, and a further 26% reduction with an additional 20% premium loading. If the commercially viable IBLI contract rate is set at a 20% loading, these highly elastic aggregate demand patterns show potential aggregate demand of approximately 210,000 TLU in Marsabit District alone.
These patterns highlight several points. First, relatively large herd owners will be the key drivers of a commercially sustainable IBLI product. Second, the apparent price elasticity of demand in these locations implies that a small premium reduction (e.g., through subsidization) can potentially induce large increases in quantity demanded. For example, as Figure 9 shows, a decrease in premium loading from 40% to 20% could potentially induce more than a doubling of aggregate demand. Third, while IBLI appears most valuable for the most vulnerable pastoralists (those with herd sizes around 10-30 TLU) as it could protect their herd dynamics from catastrophic shock, most of their WTP lies well below the commercially loaded IBLI premium (i.e., at least a 20% loading). This, as we showed in Figure 6 panel (c), is due to the possibility that high premium payments will impede herd accumulation across the herd growth threshold.
Premium subsidization may therefore be important if it is socially desirable to stimulate IBLI uptake among vulnerable populations. Might IBLI subsidies provide a cost-effective and productive safety net in broader social protection programs sponsored by governments or donors? That is the final question we explore using these simulation models.
Enhancing productive safety nets using IBLI
In order to investigate whether IBLI subsidies might effectively provide a productive safety net for pastoralists in northern Kenya, we first explore herd and poverty dynamic outcomes (using an asset poverty line of 10 TLU) of these 2000 simulated pastoralists under four different scenarios: (i) without insurance, (ii) with commercially loaded IBLI (assuming a 20% premium), (iii) with an optimally targeted premium subsidization scheme that maximizes asset poverty reduction outcomes, and (iv) with comparable, needs-based subsidization targeted to the poorest households with less than 20 TLU.
The targeted premium subsidization scheme is optimized by searching for the combination of subsidized premium rates targeted to different herd groups -(a) the poorest (<10 TLU), (b) the non-poor likely to fall into poverty in the longer run (10-20 TLU), (c) the vulnerable non-poor (20-30 TLU), (d) the secure pastoralists and (e) the large-scale pastoralists with >50 TLU -that yields the lowest poverty outcomes. The results (details available from the lead author by request) imply that the optimal premium subsidization scheme would provide IBLI free to group (b) and at the actuarially fair premium rate for the vulnerable non-poor groups (c) and (d), with no subsidization to groups (a) and (e). We compare this with two needs-based schemes:
subsidized to the fair rate %) 0 (  a and free provision targeted to the less well off pastoralists with herd sizes less than 20 TLU.
In each of these scenarios, the simulated household herd at the end of each season reflects the household's optimal insurance choice -i.e., insure if (induced) WTP exceeds the (subsidized) premium rate, do not insure otherwise. Therefore, the herd outcomes for the case of strictly commercial IBLI, for example, largely represent the outcomes of the insured herds of the well off pastoralists who demand WTP even at commercial rates and the uninsured herds of the rest of the population. [FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE]
The commercially loaded IBLI without subsidization, which only attracts a majority of the well-off pastoralists, has very limited effect on poverty. Average herd sizes under this scenario closely track the no-insurance case, with only modest increases largely among insured, well-off pastoralists partially protected from shocks by IBLI.
By contrast, under the optimal subsidy scheme, mean herd sizes increase more than 80%, relative to the no insurance case, over the course of a quarter century.
Likewise, the asset poverty headcount decreases slightly over time and stabilizes at a level about 10% lower than without insurance. Subsidized IBLI protects many targeted pastoralists herds against collapse beneath the critical growth threshold.
The most distributionally progressive, strictly need-based schemes achieve less than half of these optimal outcomes. While they follow similar (herd size increasing and poverty decreasing) patterns, we still observe increasing poverty headcounts even with free IBLI for the poorest. This simply reflects the fact that IBLI provides little benefit for pastoralists with low herd sizes or with high basis risk exposure. Perhaps counterintuitively, allocating scarce resources to subsidize the vulnerable non-poor may do more to keep long-term poverty headcount rates down than allocating the same resources to the poorest.
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In this simple simulation, the average cost of the optimal targeted subsidization scheme, which reaches 20%-50% of the population over 54 historical seasons, is roughly $50 per beneficiary per six-month season.
26
This implies a $20 per capita cost per one percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate, in contrast to $38 for the needs-based
scheme. An effective safety net can be both cheaper and more effective in stemming long-run poverty than traditional transfer programs (Barrett et al. 2012) .
Conclusions
Covariate livestock mortality is a key source of vulnerability among east African pastoralists and often drives households into extreme persistent poverty. In the presence of poverty traps resulting from well-documented nonlinear herd growth dynamics in the 25 Barrett et al. (2012) Our analysis adds to the current literature because of our focus on asset riskrather than income risk -and the existence of bifurcated asset dynamics in the northern Kenyan pastoral system. These two characteristics require important innovations in ex ante impact assessment of insurance. We develop a dynamic simulation model and a modified expected utility-based evaluation criterion in order to take into account the potential dynamic impact of IBLI. We use household-level parameter estimates including household-specific risk preferences elicited from field experiments as well as basis risk parameters estimated from panel data from the region to explore a) key patterns of variation in IBLI performance, b) patterns of willingness to pay, and c) the aggregate demand for IBLI.
We find that household initial herd size -i.e., ex-ante wealth -is the key determinant of IBLI performance, more so than household risk preferences or basis risk exposure. IBLI works least well for the poorest, whose meager endowments effectively condemn them to herd collapse given prevailing herd dynamics. By contrast, IBLI is most valuable for the vulnerable non-poor, for whom insurance can stem collapses onto a trajectory of herd decumulation following predictable shocks.
We find that a 10% strike contract consistently outperforms higher strike level contracts. District-level aggregate demand appears highly price elastic with potentially limited demand for contracts with commercially viable premium loadings. Because willingness to pay is especially price sensitive among the most vulnerable pastoralists (i.e. those not currently caught in a poverty trap, but on the verge of falling into one) for whom the product is potentially most beneficial, subsidization of asset insurance as a safety net intervention may prove worthwhile. Simple simulations find that relatively inexpensive, partial subsidization targeted to households with herd sizes in specific ranges can significantly increase average wealth and decrease poverty, at a rate of just $20 per capita per one percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate.
The operational costs of implementing a program of targeted subsidies may be quite considerable, however. Indeed, the cost of identifying the households to be targeted under the optimal subsidy scheme as presented in the previous section may prove prohibitive. Identifying recipient households may be easier for the distributionally progressive scheme providing subsidies for households with less than 20TLUs, but would require a universal livestock census of the target areas. While the census exercise may be costly, it would have benefits beyond IBLI subsidy targeting to include, inter alia, improved efficiency of veterinary service provision and vaccination campaigns, support to anti-stock theft policies and their enforcement, the implementation of standards regimes across the value chain, and the increased ease of asset taxation and monitoring market transactions. We therefore emphasize that our findings abstract from practical considerations of policy implementation and are meant to stimulate careful thought about the most effective, as well as implementable, means to address insurable risk and its relationship to poverty in the pastoralist areas of east Africa.
Our key result is also that IBLI will be less valuable to the poorest whose assets are too small relative to the critical threshold and whose herd decumulation therefore cannot not be altered through IBLI alone. In order to make IBLI work as economic development tool, promotion of IBLI might need to be complemented by promotion of asset accumulation programs. This could include targeted asset transfer programs to first move the poor toward the critical herd size threshold. They could also include expanding access to credit, the introduction of risk mitigating interventions and other efforts that would effectively lower the asset bifurcation threshold. With these longer-term adjustments, IBLI might become more valuable to the poorest as well. . Assuming, for simplicity, that typical insurance in reducing the probability of herd loss during a bad season, while the premium payment speeds up herd decumulation during good seasons. By (6), the IBLI valuation is the same as that in the standard insurance case without bifurcated asset dynamics:
For this cohort, the value of IBLI (reflected in a positive risk premium growth rate) depends on the extent to which IBLI imperfectly compensates for the insured's losses and household-specific risk preferences. However, since households in this cohort converge to the low-level equilibrium with or without insurance, IBLI offers them relatively little in the way of economic relief.
(II) The second cohort consists of pastoralists expecting to grow their herds. Beginning herd sizes are modestly above * H and grow if the season is good and when they do not pay the insurance premium. However, paying the insurance premium drops them beneath
in a good season. Because IBLI shifts down their herd growth trajectory, the risk premium growth rate is effectively taxed by 1 1
, as is evident from the certainty equivalent growth rate: 
Since IBLI preserves their herd growth trajectory, IBLI increases their insurance valuation relative to the case without bifurcated asset dynamics by the factor . 1 1
For this reason, the dynamic welfare impact of IBLI for this cohort is
The last cohort consists of pastoralists with herd sizes so large that even without 
Overall, cohorts three and four -the wealthier segments of this at risk population -represent the main source of demand for IBLI in this setting. The expected threshold-based performance of IBLI in the presence of bifurcated wealth dynamics mirrors the patterns found in Lybbert and Barrett (2011) in a different poverty trap model that does not consider insurance options. The conditional herd mortality rates are also plotted here to illustrate that during the good seasons, more households enjoy positive net growth rates (i.e., mortality rate below nonmortality growth rate), while those above the critical herd size threshold of 12-20 animals maintain just slightly above zero growth during the bad seasons. Barrett (2007, 2011) report similar findings in neighboring southern Ethiopia. 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.14 LogLogistic (-0.3,0.3,6.9) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 LogLogistic (-1.4,1.4,27.1) 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11 Lognorm(0.4, 0.04, Estimated (2000) (2001) (2002) (2007) (2008) Observed (2000) (2001) (2002) (2007) (2008) Binswanger (1980) . Though this simple elicitation method produces coarse categorical estimates of risk aversion, they work well compared to more complicated methods, especially among subjects with little or no literacy (Dave et al. 2010; Dohmen et al. 2007; Anderson and Mellor 2008) . We estimate the range of coefficients of relative risk aversion implied by each possible choice of gambles under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) according to:
and k=1,2.
 represents probability of each possible payoff P and R is the CRRA coefficient. In each case, the upper (lower) bound of R can be calculated as the value of R that generates same utility level for the payoffs associated with the preferred gamble and the less (more) risky adjacent. Following Binswanger (1980) , we assign a mean CRRA measures to each of the ranges using the geometric mean of the two end points. We then assign each household to one of the six risk aversion classifications (extreme, severe, intermediate, moderate, low/neutral and neutral/risk seeker).
Summary of Risk Preference Elicitation Set-Up
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